tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN July 31, 2015 4:00am-6:01am EDT
military partners, and we have offered sophisticated military equipment including long-range strike capabilities to some of our partners. in conclusion, this is a good deal because it removes the continued source of threat and uncertainty in a comprehensive and verifiable way. it is a deal that takes no option away from a future president. this is an important achievement and a deal that deserves your support. meanwhile, the united states, the department of defense, and the men and women of the finest fighting force the world has ever known will continue, with your support to work in americans interests defend allies, and upholds the president's commitment that iran will not gain a nuclear weapon should it walk away from this deal.
mr. mccain: thank you. mr. dempsey. mr. dempsey: i will keep my comments brief. as i have stated previously i was consulted during the course of the negotiations and provided my best military advice. it addresses a critical and the most dangerous point of friction with the iranian regime, but as i have stated repeatedly, there are at least five other areas of concern from weapons trafficking to the use of surrogates and proxies in naval minds and undersea activity, and last but not least, to malicious activity in cyberspace. the negotiated deal does not
change the options at our disposal. we will continue to engage our partners in the region to address these areas. ultimately time and iranian behavior will determine if the nuclear agreement is effective and stable. in the interim, i will provide my best military advice and options. with that, i look forward to your questions. mr. mccain: we have a vote right now, and usually we vote -- we bounce back and forth, but i think this is important enough for us to recess. i would ask the indulgence of our witnesses. i apologize. if we could recess for 10 minutes while we are able to
congress has not been made privy to. could i ask that since these side agreements have to do with the weapons programs of the iranians and the inspection and verification of those programs will we in congress receive the information concerning those side agreements in order to make a judgment as to the degree of verification? mr. carter: chairman, i think it is important that the content of those agreements and the manner in which they provide for verification of the new year
undertaking a ron is making in this agreement and the procedures of the iaea would be known to the congress. i cannot speak to the actual specific documents themselves. i'm sure secretary kerry can. but it is an important part of the verification of the agreement, and obviously verification is an important art of any agreement. let me ask if he wants to add anything. clegg's first of all, to be honest, i would not call them side -- >> first of all, to be honest, i would not call them side agreements. the iaea i, as a standard, negotiates a safeguards confidential document with the country to define the protocols. mr. mccain: those particles are
very important mr. secretary. are we going to be aware of those protocols, because we know with any agreement, the devil is in the details. critics personally, i have not seen the documents. -- >> personally, i have not seen the documents. mr. mccain: which is astounding. >> all i can say is their agreement requires cooperation with the iaea, and this is the standard practice of the iaea, which is critical to all of us. mr. mccain: what is critical is that we have verification of the inspection of iranian activities because they have a clear record of cheating. >> we agree. mr. mccain: so we believe, all of us, that we should see those instruments of verification. otherwise, how can we make a
judgment as to whether these agreements can be enforced and verified with a country that has a long record of cheating? >> the iaea will take the information that iran must provide by october 14, and at that point, we will understand to be iaea's confidence in their verification methods. mr. mccain: so we are then dependent on the confidence of the iaea not the actual viewing of the agreement and verification. i don't think many of us would agree with that process. general dempsey, you talked with the committee a few weeks ago. "under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on iran relative to ballistic missile and arms trafficking. now we are seeing after five years of relief of sanctions on
conventional arms and eight years of ballistic missiles." how does this comport with the statement you made before the committee? mr. dempsey: it will not surprise you to know that my recommendation was to keep pressure on iran for as long as possible. i will say i think that time works for as as well as a ran in this regard. with the agreement made and having the opportunity to give my advice, i support it. mr. mccain: do you believe iran will change its behavior if this agreement is finalized and have you seen any indication of that? >> i have not, and speaking from my own judgment, i have no
reason to foresee that. that's why it's important the agreement be verifiable. that's why it's important iran not have a nuclear weapon. that's also why it is important that we do everything we need to do to defend our friends and allies, remain strong in the gulf, freedom of navigation, ballistic whistle defense, all of the things we're doing. -- ballistic missile defense all of the things we're doing. the agreement does not limit us in anyway. if iran changes its behavior, that would be welcome, but i see no reason to foresee that. mr. mccain: i see no reason to foresee it, and i see them now with about $50 billion to $60 billion with which to pursue those activities. i hear secretary lew and others say don't worry, they will use it for domestic purposes.
they are doing it now with the assets they have. one can only imagine what they would do with 60 billion additional dollars. i know the witnesses have very busy schedules. i am grateful you sought to testify before the committee today in order to help us understand this issue, and i thank you. senator reid. mr. reid: thank you very much. you indicated in your statement that the united states has not given up military options with respect to the iranians. it has also not given up any military intelligence or national intelligence with respect to iran. those intelligence operations, i would presume, would be focused in great detail on potential violations of this treaty. is that your sense? >> yes, without going into detail here, it certainly is that we have intelligence
activity focused on the uranium nuclear program. but on everything else they are doing. malign activity, cuts force ballistic missiles, arms transfers, the whole thing. it's a very important intelligence effort. mr. reid: i understand that general coffee indicated that he is confident, i think is a reasonable explanation, of the intelligence community's ability to detect any significant violation of the treaties with or without direct contact with iaea. is that a fair judgment in your mind? >> yes cia director: the -- the cia director and others all made statements that we would have far greater insight into the running program with the agreement. i would add that far greater
insight will persist essentially forever. mr. reid: general dempsey, in your military assessment, what is more effective in delaying or stopping the iranian nuclear program at this time or in the new year -- or in the near future? a military strike or this agreement? general dempsey: i would like to point out that military options remain. i believe a negotiated settlement provides a more durable and reduces near-term risk, which buys time to work with regional partners to address the other malign activities. but there are about five military implications. you have invited me here today to talk about the military applications. the first is it does reduce the risk of a near-term conflict with iran over their nuclear program. another military implication is we have to sustain those
options. they have to be preserved into the future. third, there is clearly opportunity for a ran to use some of the revenue they gain for malign purposes, and that bears watching in collaboration with our regional partners including israel. fourth, this will require us to strengthen collaboration in that part of the world. fifth, we should and will maintain our foreign presence. those are the military implications. mr. reid: in terms of the military expenditures, roughly double what the rainy and spend? -- what the iranians spend and has the capacity of going much higher, is that a fair assessment? generall dempsey: double is fair. mr. reid: we have to make sure
those resources are focused and can determine or defeat any aggression by there rainy ends or proxy aggression -- by the iranians or proxy aggression. >> we have a series of initiatives with the israelis to better position ourselves to address those other malign activities. mr. reid: we have a situation developing rather resources are available. we are trying to reorganize in collaboration with the regional partners so they are much more effective to respond. so essentially, we are not ignoring these constant threats by iranians on the ground. indeed, we are in a sense camping up our activities. is that fair? >> dash cam thing -- amping up our activities. is that fair? >> this does cause us to increase our military -- we have
to increase our attention to malign activities. mr. reid: thank you. >> i am right now in the middle of one of the largest bills of the year. i am the sponsor. therefore, i have not been in on all of this fun. i read this morning in "the washington post," that president obama promised that the nuclear deal with iran would be based not on trust but unprecedented verification. it turns out it is based on trust after all, trust in two secret side agreements negotiated separately that apparently no one, including the obama administration has seen. only the iaea and iran have yet to actually see it. the u.s. news & world report says by law the administration
is required to provide congress all contents of the deal. secretary kerry do you agree with that an analysis of the law and what your requirement is? mr. kerry: senator, let me just say to clarify the earlier part of the question, congress will be fully briefed on this agreement in a classified session, and indeed, one of our key negotiators, the day to day lead negotiator, wendy truman, was briefed on it, and ernie moneys was likewise briefed on it, so we are aware of what the basics are. it is standard procedure in the countries that have an agreement with the iaea, that are signed up with the mpt. senator: my question is, are we
entitled -- mr. kerry: correct. those that are part of the agreement, per se. this is by reference, and no country has access to the confidential agreements directly of the iaea. senator: i don't mean to interrupt you, but my time is limited. i cannot imagine that this would not be part of what we all were briefed on. yesterday when congressman poe last the question, secretary rice said she -- asked the question, secretary rice said she had seen the deal and was going to share it with congress. at the same time or prior to the time that secretary rice saw it, did you see it? mr. kerry: secretary rice has not seen it. she has been briefed on it. i gave her the exact quote. she has been briefed on it, she
hasn't actually seen it. senator: i will give you her quote and make sure it is in the record. she said she did see it and did evaluate it. she said six days ago she had seen it and reviewed it, and that congress will get to see it in a classified session. mr. kerry: senator you are quoting congressman poe. i corrected him with the direct quotes that we took from public record. her quote is that she has been briefed, not that she has seen it. senator: i don't think that is correct. mr. kerry: the white house press briefing -- senator: the hill magazine had something about that, and it was prior to the time -- it was six or seven days ago that we had a confidential briefing. i was there. you were there. most of the people at this table
were there. in a classified session you cannot say what was said, but was that addressed at all? mr. kerry: it was. a question came up about it and the answer was given that of course congress will be briefed with respect to the contents, and of course you need to be briefed. everybody needs to be briefed. senator: my point is that was a classified session where we were to be briefed at that time and we weren't. mr. kerry: i don't think we had the full material too brief. i didn't have it come anyway. but we are prepared, and i think wendy sherman is going to be briefing shortly on that. what we did providing can provide is the actual roadmap that the iaea put out and the iaea has issued a full roadmap of their expectation -- senator: i understand that. but i am talking about the secret document. mr. kerry: it's a confidential agreement.
it's being postured as this -- it's a confidential agreement which is the standard of the iaea. we have lived with the iaea for years. historically, they always create what is called a comprehensive safeguard agreement, a csa which they negotiate with the country, and we don't get that -- it's not shared with the world. the reason it is confidential has to do with what you can get out of that country, but we do get briefed on it. we are aware of it. secretary moneyonize may have tightened it up a bit. you have confidence in it. senator: i would say as chairman it is incomprehensible that we did not have full access to that and i think most people agree with that. but my time is expired. thank you. mr. mccain: senator nelson.
senator nelson: thank you gentlemen all. thank you for your public service. secretary loew, i want to go down a different road. we have heard so many commentaries about how much of a windfall the sanctions relief would be for iran. we have heard over 150 billion dollars. the chairman is speaking of $50 billion. tell me if this is correct. sanctions relief of what has been withheld is about $100 billion. but within that $100 billion there are contractual obligations of iran to pay some $50 billion, and therefore, the net that would approximately come to iran would be about $50
billion. is that somewhere in the ballpark? jack lew: that is correct. the one thing i would add is there is between 50 billion dollars and $60 billion that is accessible, but that money is not sitting -- senator: but that's where i wanted to go. that money is sitting in foreign banks, is it not? jack lew: it is sitting around the world in china, india and many other countries. senator: china india japan taiwan uae, those banks? check loop: correct. -- jack lew: correct. senator: therefore, even if we deny the lifting of economic sanctions, that money is in the
hands of foreign banks. what, in your professional opinion, is the likelihood that money would the released? jack lew: to be clear, that money belongs to iran. it has gone in foreign accounts and it is sitting there. if the deal were to be rejected, the question is what do the other banks do. i don't think they will feel bound to hold the money the way they have held it in escrow away from iran. i think with out -- without a nuclear agreement, some of that money will start going back to iran, if this agreement is rejected. senator: so, to recapitulate, if we were to reject it, the money is likely to flow because it is in the hands of foreign banks who would not be compelled to it here to the united states wishes at that point, is that correct?
jack lew: we do have sanctions we could impose in other ways, but this money in banks, we could not lock it up directly. we need the cooperation of other governments and central banks to keep this money from iran. just to add one more detail, i think the notion that somehow a $60 billion check gets written is wrong. this is the reserve they need to settle foreign transactions. they are already doing transactions in some countries using foreign reserves and exchange. they still need to buy things overseas. they cannot just spend all this money or their ability to conduct international commerce goes away. they have hundreds of billion dollars -- billions of dollars of competing domestic needs. while i cannot say they will not
use it for malign purposes, i have never said that, i do think their ability to use this has been exaggerated. senator: can you explain to the committee the ability the united states government will have on the uranium and plutonium programs as a result of the agreements stating there have to be modifications and/or dismantlement of the plutonium reactor? price yes, senator. on the uranium centrifuges, we will have -- >> yes, senator. on the uranium center fuses -- centrifuges, we will have technology to make sure the idle ones are locked up and used only as replacements for broken ones.
for 20 years we will have containment and surveillance of all manufacturing of the centrifuge parts. as general clapper said, we have tremendously enhanced insight into their program. on the plutonium they will be required to take out the core part of the reactor, fill it with concrete, and then with international collaboration, and we will be part of that, we will make sure that the replacement reactor is the one that produces -- reduces plutonium production by a factor of about 10, way below the amount needed for a weapon. secondly, they have also agreed that the spent fuel for life will be sent out of the country. we have very good containment there. senator: thank you mr.
chairman, and thanked all of you. i have been a member of an chair of the strategic sub committee over the years. it has been a unified view of the world's developed nations that iran not have a nuclear weapon. it is a grave threat to peace in the world. henry kissinger sitting where you are said a few months ago that if iran gets a nuclear weapon, proliferation dangers are very real, and that is why the whole world is very worried about where we are. i believe the initial era of negotiations commenced in 2000 nine after president bush had pulled back because of the behavior of iran.
we have been exceedingly warned that talking can be a trap, and the deeper we get into this talk, the less able we are to take corrective action and alter the situation as we see it. now i am afraid we have in the goal that we had pretty well unanimous with the world behind. secretary carter, do you believe iran represents the world's foremost sponsor of terrorism? mr. carter: state sponsor, probably so. unfortunately, it is such a kaleidoscope these days that there are lots of sources of terror, but i think for state sponsorship.
senator: i think that is a consensus. secretary kerry testified yesterday that yesterday in the house. i wish it were not so. there is a dream that somehow iran can be brought in from the cold and we can work with them but i believe it was the former advisor to president reagan, but mcfarland, who said revolutionaries don't go back on the revolution. do you believe that supreme leader khamenei remains committed to the revolutionary goals of the iranian revolution? mr. carter: i read what he says which suggests that he does. senator: i don't believe he has any intention to abandon that. he was recently at an event and led a rally. chance punctuated the rally death to america, death to israel.
do you believe those reflect his views? mr. carter: again, i am not an expert. but it certainly seems so, and that is a reason to be concerned about iran's support for terrorism and especially to make sure they don't get a nuclear weapon, which is key. senator: i think that is the only conclusion we can reach that he means what he says. we can think it strange but it is serious. it represents a radical ideological agenda of this regime, which makes it a pariah regime, a danger to the entire world. negotiating an agreement that allows them to obtain missiles is also dangerous, even if it is five years or eight years out. iranians are very patient. you asked earlier about this and said the reason we want to
stop iran from having an icbm program is because the eyes stands for intercontinental, which means having the capability -- i stands for intercontinental, which means having the capability to fly to the united states. after eight years, they have been able to cheat and purchase on the open market items that could help them build an icbm system capable of reaching the united states. mr. carter i am and i think we all need to be concerned about their missile at today's -- missile activities with or without this agreement. i spoke earlier about missile defense of israel. senator: you say they should not
have this capability and we should stop it, and this agreement, does it not allow them to purchase anything they need on the world market? mr. kerry: no, senator. let me answer that. eight years represents the best we were able to negotiate with three countries of the seven who said there should be nothing. but we were comfortable accepting the idea of the eight. we were comfortable because we have a number of other tools already available to us which we could apply to be able to prosecute their efforts with respect to myself -- two missiles specifically. we have the executive order of the president of the united states which allows him to sanction anybody who is
providing any materials for missile construction. we have the proliferation security initiative with 100 countries which allows us to block the transfer of materials for weapons construction. we have the iran-north korea -syria nonproliferation act. we have huge tools available to us way into the future. senator: it seems like the last agreement would trump that. mr. kerry: there is no trumpeting of anything. senator: i don't know what the language is in their -- is in there if it has no meaning. mr. kerry this protects us with respect to missile development. we also have u.n. sanctions that prohibit the flow of weapons to has below, to iraqi shia, too --
senator: they are flowing now are they not? mr. kerry: indeed, because they have not been enforced. which is why the administration has decided we need to do this more effectively and i am meeting to layout the specifics of the proposal of how we're going to push back against iran. you have adequately and appropriately pointed to the rhetoric of the leader and to the things they are doing. simple question. if that is what they want to do are we better off preventing them from getting a nuclear weapon, or do we want to go right back to where they were where they had 19,000 centrifuges, enough for 10 to 12 bombs? don't be looking 10 to 15 years down the road. right now, they have this ability, and we are stopping
that. we are taking that away from them and providing a life time of inspection. mr. mccain: senator, your time has expired. how did the north korean deal work out for you? senator mccaskill. mr. kerry: don't ask me. i didn't write the deal. senator mccaskill: is there anything that would constrain our ability to take any action we felt was necessary against iran? mr. kerry: no. senator: one thing i do not think has been covered enough in all of the testimony that has occurred, i got the point that senator nelson was trying to make, that the money is not in our control, and it appears, looking at it, if all the other countries walk away from us, if we reject this deal, that they are going to get the money one way or another, either because
they are entitled to it if we do the deal or because we cannot control it. but i don't know that that is completely accurate, and i think it's important. this is not about is this a good deal. this is also about what happens if we don't do this deal. i think it's important to talk about whether the power of the united states would have if this deal was rejected to in fact force our will on these countries that hold this money. we have a lot of tools at our disposal as the major economic power that we are, a lot of these are our nato allies. obviously, japan. so, i think it's fair that we shouldn't just say if we walk away from this deal they are going to get all the money. i think it's fair to try to drill down and you try to give us a picture. let's assume -- i know none of you want to assume that this deal is rejected, but let's assume that it is. at that moment, what power do we
have is a country to keep this money from flowing to iran and its nefarious activities? >> senator it is a very fair question, and obviously, nobody can give you a precise answer because there are perfectly legal ways for them to use this money now. if they buy chinese goods, they can pay with the reserves held in china. they can make a decision to acquire the things they need to acquire through the countries that have reserves and chip away at those reserves. the question of what unilateral sanctions versus multilateral sanctions can do is a powerful one. we don't have the ability to reach out to all foreign banks and all foreign transactions. i think it is at our unparalleled we have a sanctions
regime where we are enforcing unilateral actions that the rest of the world is rejecting, which is very different from what has been going on over the last few years. we have worked bilaterally with countries around the world to do things against their own economic interest because they agreed with us on the imperative of stopping iran from getting a nuclear weapon. if they see as walk away from an agreement that they believe would stop iran from getting a nuclear weapon, i believe the degree of cooperation would go down considerably. it's not black-and-white. but what has made a sanctions regime so effective is the fact that we have had international cooperation. india and china have been buying less oil from iran than has been good for their economy. how do you enforce bilaterally with countries around the world doing things against their interest, just by saying we insist? there are things we can do, but it gets much harder. senator mccaskill: i appreciate
that answer, but i think it would be helpful for those of us trying to analyze both scenarios if you all would try, to the best of your ability, put in writing, what you would and vision, what would be our best effort in keeping iran isolated if in fact this deal is rejected . i don't think it is fair for us to assume we have no power if this deal is rejected. clearly, we are still going to have a lot of power. i am almost out of time. i know this is a hard question to give an exact answer to, but do you believe if we walk away from this deal that iran has a nuclear weapon by christmas? >> a cannot really answer that question. senator mccaskill: do your best. i think it is important for us to know how close they are. mr. moniz: they could certainly generate the materials within
months, which is before christmas. what is unknown is the degree to which they have completed which we cannot discuss right now other weaponization requirements. that is what the iaea, in building up its dossier over many years which it now needs to complete, certainly has identified labeled iran as having had a structured program of activities relevant to nuclear weapons in the past. it is a threshold state and that is the risk we face. the deal will walk them back from that threshold and give us permanently more insight into any weapons program they might choose to pursue. secretary mccaskill: thank you. >> they are a nuclear threshold state and have denied all along that they had any intention of doing so up into the present
time. i think that is instructive. i think senator mccaskill may be onto something here with all of the options before us. my friend senator reid asked if we were better off with a negotiated settlement or a military strike as if those were the only two alternatives. of coarse, we know those were not the only two alternatives. i wish our friends had not been so eager to leave the sanctions regime, but they were. the united states could go it alone. we do have unilateral tools that would be effective. so continuing trying to get a good deal, continued unilateral tools on the part of the united states making people choose between banking with america and banking with iran, those tools are there. let me say mr. dempsey, i
appreciate your service and i appreciate the many times you have come before this committee. we have disagreed and agreed from time to time. it would seem to me that your brief nine sentence opening statement before this committee amounts to damning this agreement with faint praise. there are six areas in which iran is a bad actor and five of these activities give us through concern. you list them and then give us these words of assurance. ultimately time and iranian behavior will determine if a nuclear to agreement -- nuclear agreement is effective. that does not give me a confidence level. based on your brief and tepid endorsement of this agreement.
with regard to the conventional arms embargo as late as this spring, we were not hearing about this. general dempsey, when did you become aware that there would be this huge relief from the conventional arms embargo, and isn't it a fact that it caught you by surprise? general dempsey: i would ask you not to characterize my statement as cap ignore enthusiastic, but pragmatic. i have said from the -- as tepid nor enthusiastic, but pragmatic. i have said from the start that i believe diplomatic options are preferable but i remain ready for military. when military implications
became part of the conversation i was asked for advice and i gave my final recommendation regarding sanctions about a week or two before the deal was finalized. senator: that seems very late to me. the advice we have been getting on the other side of this agreement, down through the months and over the time that this massive retreat from conventional arms embargoes is something new and something very troubling. let me just say, mr. chairman in the minute i have left, that the assessment of the facts and the assessment of the effect this agreement will have by
neighbors in the region i think is so instructive and should be so instructive to this congress. i don't blame my friends on the democratic side of the aisle for having concerns also. it is striking that from right to left, every ideology within the country of israel is opposed to this agreement. it is striking that the arab neighbors, the saudi's and others, are alarmed at this deal. and i would submit to the record mr. chairman, in the closing seconds, an op-ed by ra shop at -- ari shabbat in which he says that the randian negotiation teams succeeded -- iranian negotiating team succeeded in destroying the sanctions mechanism. china and russia recognize again and again iran's right to develop advanced centrifuges
which could be five to 10 times bigger than the capacity of the old ones. the biz means -- this means that the international community is not only enabling, but actually ensuring the establishment of a new iranian nuclear program which will be immeasurably more powerful and dangerous than its predecessor. i submit this article for the record mr. chairman. mr. mccain: without objection. senator shaheen. senator: thank you for your efforts on this negotiation and for being here today. secretary carter, you're in the middle east last week. can you tell us what you heard from our allies in the middle east about what they felt about this agreement, specifically saudi arabia and israel?
obviously, we have heard what prime minister netanyahu had to say. mr. carter: prime minister netanyahu was very clear and has been clear publicly in his opposition to the deal. we discussed that, but we discussed many other things as well. hezbollah's activity on the border with lebanon. in fact, i visited there. our missile defense activities, our cyber security cooperation our intelligence cooperation lots of other regional issues. we discussed many topics. he was very clear. senator: would you agree with the characterization that the israelis were united in their opposition to the agreement from left to right? mr. carter: i only spoke with the prime minister. he was as he has been publicly very clear.
senator: what did you hear from some of our arab allies? mr. carter: i spoke to the king of saudi arabia who repeated to me us hate men he had issued -- repeated to me a statement he had issued a few days before supporting the agreement. he reiterated that the verification and snapback provisions were important to him. he referenced those things. and then we went on to talk about other things that are more related to the defense of agenda including his air forces munitions, cyber concerns that saudi arabia has, and something we started to discuss at the gcc, namely saudi arabia's role in countering isil, which is a
whole other subject. senator: did you hear from any of our other arab allies in the middle east to that they were in agreement? mr. carter: i spoke to the jordanians about it. again, it was not a major topic. we had a lot of other things to talk about. i don't recall exactly what they said. again, it wasn't really the subject of our meeting. those are the three places i met with. senator: thank you. general dempsey, is there a military option short of invasion that would roll back iran's nuclear program more substantially over the next 10 years than the jc boa does, in your opinion? general dempsey: i would have to make assumptions about how often we would he compelled to conduct -- we would be compelled to
conduct airstrikes. the military options could disrupt the program by several years. there is nothing to say we could not repeated if necessary. senator: is there any intelligence to suggest what iran's response would be should we engage in an airstrike against them? general dempsey: the analysis suggests that they would counter our presence in the region at every opportunity and use what they have available to them. senator: thank you. secretary moniz there has been a lot of discussion about the 24 day delay. could you clarify the extent to which we would be able to detect nuclear activity, so, uranium, in an extended time beyond the 24 day?
what if the activity does not include nuclear material? to what extent do you believe we could detect other activity other then uranium related or nuclear related activity? mr. moriz: first, let me reiterate that the 24 day timeline is new again, to repeat nuclear materials, we have very sensitive capabilities and can add more classified context. with regard to nonnuclear materials, it gets more difficult. when one has nuclear weapons specialized activities such as explosively driven neutron initiators, we would not be without tools to detect activities in that kind of time,
but clearly, as one gets farther and farther away into just conventional explosive testing which is what militaries do normally, then it is a question of putting together context. in the end, you need the nuclear materials to get to the weapon and that is where we have extraordinary techniques. if i may add one more comment, if you permit, just to go back to the comment on advanced centrifuges. i don't know the particular article you quoted, but it appears to have forgotten to mention that their most advanced machines are already operating at full cascade level, two different machines, and those are going to be dismantled before this is implemented. senator: i have been informed that senator ernst is required to provide -- preside over the
vital proceedings on the floor of the united states senate critical to her presence, so i would ask my colleagues to indulge her and allow her to proceed. senator: thank you. this well be one of the most significant votes we take as members of congress moving forward. i think it is imperative that we get this right. not long ago, the united states discovered that we had had a data breach at opm. simple. data personnel records had been tapped into. so, that's just laying the groundwork of where i'm going next. secretary carter and secretary moniz, i am very concerned regarding the government's ability to did tech and prevent -- detect and prevent cyber attacks on our government. with regards to james clapper
around has conducted cyber attacks on u.s. officials hacking which compromised the marine corps internet, sans las vegas casino, and attacks against u.s. banks. these attacks along with recent successful attacks against opm leads me to have less than full confidence of our own super -- cyber capabilities, let alone the cyber capabilities at the iaea. it is vital iaea has a lock tied ability to protected's equipment and technology, vital to ensuring effective monitoring of iranian facilities under this agreement against cyber attacks. simple yes or no, secretary carter. are you concerned regarding iran's ability to impact the effectiveness of iaea monitoring equipment through cyber? mr. carter: i am sorry, i cannot
give you a yes or no. i am very concerned about iranian cyber activity. you name three countries. i could go on. this is a problem, and sadly, i share the lack of confidence you have in the adequacy of our defenses. in the defense department, you would think we would be secure, but we are not, and we know that. it is not just a rant, but others as well -- i ran but others as well. that is why we are trying to make investments in that area and pull up our sock's on cyber but i cannot reassure you. senator:the iaea does have some -- senator: they are more advanced
than the united states. mr. carter: ciber is tough. it is something that keeps us up all the time. we have develop our capabilities. senator: i have no confidence that we would not be able to know if there were tampering involvement going on as we monitor these activities. or if the iaea tries to monitor these activities. i hope they improve those measures. i believe we are vulnerable as we have seen with our own infrastructure. general dempsey, we have heard from other discussions today about this agreement. many news outlets, usa today others had quoted president obama as the choice is the iran nuclear deal or war. this seems to be a military
decision. i understand that you advised the president on these issues. is that what you have told the president? we take this deal or we go to war? martin dempsey: no. at no time did that come up in our conversation or i made that comment. senator: who is advising the president? martin dempsey: i could not answer that. we have a range of options. i always present them. senator ernst: it is imperative everybody on this panel understand there are other options available out there. a multitude of options. we are taught in the military about dime. diplomatic options, information operation. military operations and economic types of sanctions and opportunities that we might have. for the president to reject everything the war is outrageous to me.
i do hope that you are able to better advise him that he needs to be careful with his language because that seems to be the rhetoric we are hearing is that we either go to war or we accept this deal. i reject that premise. martin dempsey: as long as we agree that military strikes is an act of war per there are things tween here and there. senator ernst: i agree. thank you very much. senator: general dempsey, you answered -- first of all let me thank everyone at this table for your service to our nation and the hard work and dedicated service that produce this agreement whether we vote for it or not. i have -- i have made no decision for myself for the nation owes its gratitude for the hard work you have done.
it is fair to say general dempsey that the breakout time for iran to produce enough material for a nuclear weapon will return to what it is now 2-3 months after the 10 year periods. martin dempsey: i don't know that it is fair to say that because i think that some of the additional protocols which are out of my area of expertise could inhibit them for a longer time. senator: let's assume for the moment that in fact the bracket -- breakout time is reduced to what it is now. will the united states be in a stronger or weaker position militarily if the military option is necessary? martin dempsey: the chairman earlier pointed out that it
will make it more difficult but not make it more impossible. it depends on how we use the time between now and then. we have to plan with our allies in the region to increase their capabilities over that time. if we use the time wisely and have the resources necessary to do it we should not assume we are in a weaker position. senator: the iranians will use that time to build their conventional forces. at the very least they will have more revenue from various sources if the sanctions are lifted. martin dempsey: they are starting from an extra ordinarily weekend position -- weakened position. senator: where i am going is what changes do you think the
united states has to take both to make sure that our national security is assured and that our allies -- what specific changes should the armed services committee be supporting in the near and longer term? martin dempsey: that is almost a separate hearing. i would suggest we need to have the budget certainty that the secretary of defense has articulated and secondly that we should not at this point in time consider reducing our force presence in the middle east area of responsibility. senator: secretary lew, let me turn to the economic sanctions that could be available. which my colleague from iowa has mentioned.
can those be put back in place? can the united states even without our allies use its finance system and its bank to implement a severe sanctions system? jack lew: senator we certainly have significant tools that we could use again unilaterally. but we have seen over the last several years is the impact of sanctions that have had a crushing impact on iran's economy. it has brought them to the table. they have reached the agreement we are here discussing. the notion we can unilaterally surpassed that is something that its inconsistent. senator: we can certainly make a significant and also severely damaging effort if we choose to do so. jack lew: we can. what i would say the snapback
provisions that are in this agreement if iran valid -- violates, the sanctions will be back in place. senator: the challenge will be to mobilize. jack lew: i don't think there is a challenge. the way it was constructed, it is a very strong snapback provision. in a way that weakens, that we can work out will by exercising a veto if there is a disagreement with us. senator: did you have a comment? mr. kerry: there is a surreality here. with all respect, the president of the united states is not mandating war. he doesn't want to go. it is not his choice. he is not advocating war. if you analyze the alternatives here, and this is what i mean by surreality, could the united states continue sanctions? to what end? to negotiate?
with whom? do you think the ayatollah is going to come and negotiate? senator: please shorten your remarks. mr. kerry: the reason the president talks about the possibility of war is iran has made it clear that if this is rejected they consider themselves back to -- to go back to enrich. the inevitable consequence of that would be what are you going to do about it? we will have lost the international support because the international community is ready to enforce this deal. if we are not unilaterally, they walk away. you have huge difficulty with sanctions and you lose your support for the military strike if there had to be one. it is not a choice the president wants to make but it is the consequence of them moving to assert the furtherance of their
program. senator: senator. senator: i want to thank the witnesses for being here. i want to take this opportunity. it is probably going to be the last time general dempsey testifies. i want to thank you for your service and the service of your family. when you appear before the committee i was the person who asked you about -- there had been floated some views in the press at that time iran was pushing for lifting of the resolution on ballistic missiles and the resolution of arms which we now know are at the agreement -- are in the agreement. when you can before the committee use it under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on iran and those issues. was he or military recommendation that we not agree to lifting of those sanctions? martin dempsey: yes.
i use the phrase as long as possible, and that was the point renegotiation continued. that was my military advice. senator: thank you. i want to ask about an issue, i know senator ernest had talked about. the iranian cyber activity. a number of years ago we saw there was an interruption of iran's nuclear program through some other cyber activity. that was reported in the press i believe. in this agreement, according to 10.2 of annex three of the deal the united states is obligated under this agreement to help strengthen iran's ability to protect against sabotage of its nuclear program. it might be hard for americans to believe that we would agree to help iran protect against
sabotage of its nuclear program in light of its prior intentions. general dempsey, i wanted to ask your opinion on that. you think it is a good idea for the united states to help protect its nuclear program against sabotage? martin dempsey: i had not thought about that. i would like to have the opportunity to do so. with respect to the cyber question, next week this committee and the senate will consider some cyber legislation that we have been eager to see past for some time so we can get ourselves better protected. senator: when we know iran continues activity on the cyber front, the idea that we would agree to help them protect its nuclear program against sabotage i i assume that would allow us to inform the israelis, if the israelis were taking over activities that would undermine its activities.
i wanted to also ask about this idea we have heard a lot about sanctions. sanctions as i understand, iran has written the united nations on july 20 about sanctions regime. one of the issues that has concerned me about this agreement is that once the sanctions, the long list of mainly congressionally mandated sanctions that will be listed under this agreement are undertaken, if iran, for example, engages in terrorist activity, which it is known to do, separate from the nuclear program, iran seems to have taken the position in its letter to the u.n. -- and i have read the agreement and i have been concerned that the agreement provides the same -- that in
fact iran says it is understood that reintroduction or reimposition including four extension of the sanctions will constitute significant nonperformance which will relieve its commitments in part or in whole. imd will he concerned that if we want to reimpose the toughest sanctions on issues related to their terrorist activities and support for terrorism, another tool in the toolbox aside from military options iran can walk away from this agreement. if the answer is you disagree with this characterization please tell me where am i wrong? >> the like which says we can't reimpose been nuclear sanctions. we have never given away our other sanctions regimes. senator: with all due respect
the nuclear sanctions are the toughest sanctions that we would impose in other contexts including on crude oil, oil and gas. jack lew: we reserve the right if there is a financial institution that is engaging and financing terrorism to put sanctions back on that institution. that is not a violation of the agreement. senator: iran seems to take a different position. jack lew: we can't take the sanctions and put them into place. what we would have to do is make the case as we have on many occasions that institution should be sanctioned on their behavior on terrorism. we will continue to do that vigilantly. all of our sanctions that apply in that area still stand. senator: thank you. every time we say goodbye to you
you come back and another week on another panel. i know it is not by choice. thank you for your service. mr. secretary, secretary of energy, if a year from now we have suspicions that something is going on, does the iaea have access to go inside that building and see it or not? jack lew: we certainly have through the initial protocol in this agreement access anywhere. that there is suspicion of nuclear activity. the protocols, i would have to see -- it is certainly a different forward-looking -- different from resolving the possibility military [inaudible] senator: we need to know whether it is -- does the iaea have access. mr. moniz: they must have the access granted to resolve the
issues that they need to resolve. we must have integrity in the process. senator: and if they do not they will be in breach of the agreement. senator: this is different than what has gone in the past. mr. kerry: it is different for there are different mechanisms to bring it to a close. under the additional protocols the lesson of north korea produced the additional protocol. now there is an initial protocol which has huge new requirements for access. jacqueline o'neill: -- senator: secretary lou, one of the proposals put forward is to say no to this deal, then to tell the other countries who are involved in regards to sanctions that a viable alternative is to say to france, germany, and
others choose us, choose them as you move forward economically, that if you are going to continue to do business with iran you can't do business with us. do you see that as by apple moving forward? >> we do have powerful tools that make it dangerous for foreign business to violate u.s. laws. if they do business and violate our sanctions we will enforce. whether we can do that against the whole world effectively without doing damage to our own economy is something we have to have serious considerations about. it is one thing -- it is another thing if we are standing on our own. it is not the same as it being affected or necessarily adding up to what we would like to accomplish. senator: secretary carter, have you -- i know you are talking to the country's, it seems to me one of the challenges here is confidence. confidence that they will be
saved pre-that israel will be saved. that is where this comes from. making sure your child can be safe and sleep safe that night. that is what mr. netanyahu is trying to ensure. as you look at it, is there any putting together a plan that says to iran, not one more inch? as we move forward you will see from year to year that in yemen not one more inch? that we will stand with the sunni tribal leaders to make sure they have success and will be a viable and strong against whatever efforts iran has in iraq. to lay out the plan, let people know, let iran know in advance would help create a better sense of confidence that there is a reason, that there is a reason to stay with us.
mr. carter: i think that is extremely important. that is what gcc companies are looking for, namely the continued commitment of the united states to help them protect themselves so they can sleep well at night, maintain our regional role, counter iran's malign influence, and activities. at the same time they recognize perfectly well what has been set up here, iran with nuclear weapons would be an indoor miss problem and -- and enormous problem. our agreement heads that operate they want to make sure we are there. that is with the gcc countries were told at camp david by the president. my trip was impart to solidify all of the things. senator: i just want to finish by saying i think it is
important to publicly state, not one inch more policy. i am not at all comfortable with our people who are still in a ron -- in iran, they have to come home. i wish they had come home as part of this agreement. i know you do too. this cannot rest we do not leave anybody behind. thank you mr. chairman. senator: thank you mr. chairman. secretary moniz i would like to follow-up on what mr. blumenthal was asking you about with regards to the breakout time. what are the main factors you consider when you calculate that breakout time? mr. moniz: the key factors are the enrichment capacity and the stockpile of enriched uranium. there are many other factors as well which come in such as the rate at which additional
capacity could be built in during a breakout time. all of this comes into our national laboratory evaluation. senator: that would include the number of centrifuges as well? mr. moniz: correct. senator: after 15 years what limits do you think will be in place on those things that you just mentioned? mr. moniz: after 15 years they will probably expand their capacity after those restraints. that is why such a key element is the verification measures that we put in place for all time. senator: we are talking about tracking the nuclear material to make sure it is not divergent from the civilian programs. mr. moniz: for 25 years. senator: we are basically just checking in iran's math, correct? mr. moniz: checking the math. we are checking our math, if you like. senator: we are checking our
math. mr. moniz: for 25 years we follow the manufacturing. it is the supply chain that we follow. making -- our intelligence people will tell you to reproduce the entire supply chain in multiple places would be very difficult to conceal. senator: we are just looking at of course the declared facilities. mr. moniz: no, we have of course strong measures in the facility's, which by definition rests on the actions of our allies and friends intelligence capacity. senator: do you have confidence in that capacity we will locate any undeclared facilities and pressure it ran to allow us to make sure that we have verification in those as well? mr. moniz: i would go back to
the statements of general clapper and cohen. this will give us greater insight into what they are doing. that leaves us and other intelligence agencies we work with two point a iea in the right direction. we have a tool of a finite time to get access to that place or they are in material breach. senator: are you concerned on the discrepancies between statements made by our administration and compare those to what is being -- statement being made by the advisor to the supreme leader when it comes to access to -- allowing the iaea to look at the military centers in a ron -- and iran, where i believe i have heard our administration say that we do have access to those
they are declared facilities. yet the advisor to the supreme leader says the access of the specters from the iaea or any other body to iran's military centers is for bidden. who is correct? mr. moniz: we are correct. i might point out there were many statements may be for the anna -- senator: this was made july 21. mr. moniz: they were many statements. you can check them against the agreement. they don't square out. senator: how do you reconcile that? mr. moniz: those statements were clear. first of all, the aim is not to go to military sides. it is not us, it is iaea. the goal is to go where there is suspicious or suspicion of nuclear activities.
if they are in a military site it doesn't matter. they are still the iaea access to those sites. senator: i own have a few seconds left. i would hope that you would reconcile those statements for the public. mr. moniz: we cannot control their statements. senator: you have stated the 24 day waiting period will not she'll any illegal activity. as i read the agreement many people have pointed out the inspectors request to his of those sides could be delayed more than 24 days. i know that you are not concerned about the 24 day period. you believe that iaea would be able to handle that. if you look at different parts in q of annex 1 of the agreement, we have the the potential at and 89 day delay. do you think that would be possible? how confident are you -- mr. moniz: we certainly cannot
allow for that. i did not say any illegal activity. i spoke specifically as activity with nuclear material. as my real focus. number two, the iaea has any sign of our cooperation -- noncooperation they have to launch the process with the request for access. then comes the 24 days. there is classified literature of a six-month delay an attempt to conceal which did not work. they were caught red-handed. senator: you said you would not allow the 89 days. how many days after 24 days would you allow? mr. moniz: it is that the process to launch the formal request for access has to be prompt. that is the end.
senator: you would not allow anything past that? mr. moniz: i would not. senator: thank you. senator: thank you for joining us pre-thank you for your intense work on this. we care about the national security of the united states and our allies. secretary moniz you and i had a long conversation. what i would like you to discuss with the committee is the nuclear capabilities that it ran has today are considerable and most experts have given it a 2-3-month time period to have one bomb. how quickly can they ramp up to greater production, to movere highly enriched uranium. i would like you to describe what they ramp up time would look like post 8-10-15 years.
you spent a lot of time identifying what can be changed and modified in the three existing facilities so they don't run a military risk. i would like that more philip -- more described. and the last point, my constituents are concerned about clandestine operations. to the extent you can talk about that in this sitting them i would like you to discuss a clandestine line facility during the agreement. mr. moniz: quite a few questions. in terms of their current capacity, they have demonstrated the capacity to enrich uranium. that is clear. i want to emphasize that they have also demonstrated, they have enriched to 20% enrichment pre-20% is the cut off that the iaea uses for uranium. the amount of work needed to get
to 20% is nearly all the work you need to get to 90%, which would be weapons grade. they have the capability. they are already have full cascades running of the next generation, five times more powerful. this agreement will have those dismantled at the time of implementation. what is critical is we are rolling them back in every dimension of their program for at least a considerable period. the president was clear, and our p5 plus one partners were clear. a quantitative criterion was or had to be at least a one-year break out time in terms of material for at least 10 years. we have accomplished. we have accomplish that with this agreement. our lab scientists are fully behind this as our other
countries. that will roll off. after 15 years at some point, depending on what they do, then we can revert. we may revert to the current kinds of breakout times for vision of all material. we still need to keep the lid on weaponization activities, make sure those are not taken. that was a notable improvement. senator gillibrand: so they cannot make those steps for weaponization. secretary moniz: right. we will still have advanced verification procedures that can point intelligence agencies to any violations. senator gillibrand: is there anyway you can reverse those modifications? secretary moniz: the redesign
would provide us in this language a breakout time in years. once it is online, they would need years of operation to get enough plutonium to be relevant. and the iaea would detect their change in operation within one or two months here in senator gillibrand -- one or two months. senator gillibrand: if they wanted to ramp up again, would that take a significant amount of time? secretary moniz: most of the center fuse will not only be stripped out completely, but they will not even stored there. secondly, we will have a major international not only aie presence but new science opportunities. if they kick everybody out
alarm bells go off. secretary gillibrand: monetary options are better or worse after the agreement? secretary carter: it is better if the facilities -- we learn more about them. many of them are dismantled. . so in that sense, that purely military sense. senator cotton: i traveled to vienna to discover there are side deals. there are still some lack of clarity about the content. secretary kerry, have you read either of these two side deals
between the iaea and iran? secretary kerry: no, i haven't. senator cotton: have you read any scraps? secretary: i have been briefed through our team that met with the iaea. senator cotton: have you read the text of any of these agreements. secretary kerry: i believe one person may have read it at the facility, but doesn't have it, possess it. secretary cotton: what is that person's name? secretary kerry: it's possible i don't know for sure, but it's possible wendy sherman, but i don't know for sure. senator cotton: secretary moniz, have you read the context of these agreements? secretary moniz: no.
senator cotton: has anyone else reviewed the text of these agreements? secretary kerry: not that i am aware of him i don't think so. senator cotton: if secretary sherman has read these agreements, does that not undercut the claim of confidentiality? secretary kerry: i don't know she said -- if she read a summary or a draft. she will be briefing in classified. senator cotton: i have received several testified briefings on the deal. what congress would like is the text of these agreements as required by u.s. law. the associated press mentioned yesterday that the content of the side deal mentions the nuclear base where tests were
rolled out. much like an nfl taking his own euros and -- his own urine sample. senator kerry: what i can confirm is that secretary moniz, in his discussions with the team, made recommendations to them. i am the -- i believe it satisfied whatever they process is, that the process will be able to provide the answers we need. senator cotton: why can we not confirm or deny the content of these agreements in public? the ayatollahs know what they agreed to. senator kerry: because we respect the process of the iaea and we don't have their permission to reveal an agreement between them in another country.
senator cotton: so the ayatollahs will know what they agree to and not the american people. senator kerry: not exactly. we will share with you in the classified brief and -- ossified briefing. the iaea is an independent body. i don't know at this point what the law says about the united states requiring another entity' s laws prohibit. senator cowan: u.s. laws -- senator cotton: u.s. law requires not only agreements with the united states -- i think there have been passed precedent. i would like to move on to the second topic.
can i have chart 1, please? general dempsey, this chart describes a powerful roadside bomb. can you explain what the bottom diagram shows? general dempsey: a copper cone is melted at superhigh temperatures. and projected and essentially burns its way through armor plate. senator cotton: the copper disc troubles at about 6000 feet per second. can i have chart 2 to see what happens to a come the -- to a humvee when a ball of fire travels at 6000 seconds -- 6000 feet per second. do you know how many american
troops were killed by such penetrators? general dempsey: several hundred. senator cowan: was iran a main supplier of these? general dempsey: yes. senator cotton: what should we say about the over 500 american troops killed by an iranian ball of fire traveling at 6000 per second senator kerry we should tell them how extraordinary grateful we are for the service of their loved ones. we would also tell them that we lay out what we intend to do, to push back against iran's behavior, that we have a number
of laws in place requirements by which we will be able to prevent iran from transferring these weapons. and we have already engaged in vary forward leaning initiatives to do that. we specifically turned around a convoy recently in the last months, that was bringing weapons to yemen. we have been crystal clear and i will be more clear when i meet with the gulf states about our united efforts to hold them accountable for these kinds of activities. senator ono: thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to ask this question of all the witnesses, but i'd like to start with secretary carter and chairman dempsey. in... -- in your assessment, is there any military strategy or response that would achieve the same goals as the agreement and
broiling the united states and our allies and a devastating long-term war in the region? i would like a yes or no answer considering the setting. secretary carter i'm sorry to -- : it would be difficult on that, but i just need to understand the question a bit more. you mean if there is no deal, if iran gets a nuclear weapon, then we have a serious -- we would have to defend ourselveser ourselves our friends and allies in the face of that reality. is that responsive to your question? senator kane: the reality is that without this agreement iran can produce a nuclear bomb into her three months. without this agreement, is there a military response?
secretary carter: i'm going to have to say that there is a military response -- maybe this is responsive to your question. there's a military option which i know you've been briefed on that has the effect of setting back the iranian nuclear program. it doesn't stop it forever, that it substantially set it back. we have talked about to that publicly for quite a while. senator kane the other part of : my quiestion is we can have a military response that can set them back but would that involve us in a long-term war in that region? would that be a highly likely outcome? secretary carter: iran would
surely respond to such an attack. in a hypothetical situation in which that occurred, which this deal is intended to make unnecessary, iran could respond for sure. general dempsey one of my jobs : is never let the nation run out of options. we'd not run out of options but they'd become increasingly costly. senator kane: secretary kerry would you like to answer? secretary kerry: i think general dempsey answered the question earlier when he said the deal is far more durable and provides a more durable option longer term. i think if iran would start enriching and go back to its program, we have no inspectors. we have sanctions and they are universal. the united states can have them but we have already seen sanctions don't get to -- don't
get them to give up the program. so you are stuck with the situation of what will change the dynamic of the program. then you are in what secretary carter and general dempsey said -- they will respond. where does that end and how does it end and does it a cumbersome goal of getting rid of their program? we don't believe so. we believe this agreement accomplishes the goal and provides us with the support of a continuing basis from the international community. senator kane let me go on to : another question. this is for secretary carter and chairman dempsey. are you contemplateing any changes in our force posture if this agreement goes into effect and stays in effect. secretary carter yes. : if i can say more, senator, in all seriousness, yes, we are doing a great deal in the gulf. that's what i was there talking to our gulf partners
about. that is what we talked about the summit a few months ago. they were doing a great deal with israel. qualitative military edge. this is a dynamic region, with or without a deal. and one has iran and other problems to boot. so we have to and we are doing a lot to strengthen our posture and arrow alliances and partnerships in the region and we will continue to do so. secretary kane general dempsey, : would you like to weigh in? general dempsey with israel, : we're working on ballistic missile defense, kornt terrorism and countertunnel chicago is a new and emerging challenge for the state of israel. chairman i'd like to tell the
: committee that the witnesses have to leave at 12:45, so the order will be senator brown, senator king, senator till, i senator sullivan, and senator graham. senator thank you for your : service. today you've gone through many different interrogators. i get to be number 16. one of the things that happens is a lot... if we assume that we have a rogue nation who is a threshold state today with regards to nuclear weapons, the goal of this was to eliminate them from having nuclear weapons or, in the second position, to delay the ample mentation or their capabilities with regard to nuclear weapons.
i would like to know from the panel, mary simply, are we stopping them from getting nuclear weapons or are we delaying them for a dvd of 10 to 15 years from it -- them for a period of 10 to 15 years? general dempsey: my opinion, sir, our government's policy has been they will not get a nuclear weapon and nothing we're tacking about today should change that policy. senator rounds mr. moniz? secretary moneys i agree with : general dempsey. in terms of our capabilities to make sure they're not pursuing a nuclear weapon, this agreement will leave us better. secretary carter i've worn many : hats this administration and each one i've said iran will not be permitted to get a nuclear weapon. i believe that deeply. senator kerry -- secretary
kerry: there's no -- if they were to try to not implement this agreement or it's not full the other options are still available to us. they will make it a weapon. secretary carter one note to say : in addition, i think it's significant that the agreement codifies with the p5+1 that iran will never get a nuclear weapon. senator brown's: -- senator rounds: it appears in each time i've heard the discussion it comes back to over a period of ten years we have something in terms of the agreement that restricts them. if you intend and 15 years, we change, and in that time, they can because there is nothing in the agreement which stops them from moving back into and adding to their nuclear capabilities. if they are a threshold state today and we have delayed them that is one thing. but at -- but if they can pursue options, that is what we are trying to decide. along that line, general density, i appreciate your
thoughts earlier when you said you were pragmatic with regards to your comments. it seems to me that we had an embargo in place that many of us were relying on when it came to an arms embargo and also with icbm. you indicated on july 7 of this year -- under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on iran. secretary carter said the reason that we want to stop iran from having an icbm program is that the i stands for intercontinental, which means having the capability of flying from iran to the united states and we don't want that. secretary kerry indicated that there are other ways in which we could handle the situation. if we had an embargo in place and we had concerns about this, what is the purpose for the embargo if we -- general
clearly, it seems to me that you were pretty clear that this was not the kind of advice you were suggesting. general dempsey as i said : senator, i would have been happy to see the embargoes maintained in perpetuity. i think the question would have to be asked. were they likely to be sustained in perpetuity given they were imposed to bring iran to the table? when they came to the table, it became truly a negotiation. and sanctions is only one way to do this. we have other options to pursue. secretary kerry: senator, if i can add to that, we obviously all of us would prefer to have it there forever and ever. we're dealing with a u.n. resolution, the nuclear resolution of 1929 which said, if the iranians come to negotiate, then all the sections would be lifted. that is what was contemplated by the empowering resolution here. the arms embargo was slid in at
the vary last-minute by then you and representative susan rice. she got it in and it sort of slid into the nuclear provision itself. under the nuclear provision, at the end of a period of time, when the iaea draws its conclusion, this would have been lifted completely anyway and we have no power to stop that. in effect, getting the eight years is a victory. or getting the five years is a victory. but we have these other tools that completely strengthen our ability to do it in perpetuity. senator rounds: secretary carter would you say that the -- today , iran does not have the capability of getting icbm and ten years from now, based upon the provisions in place, without the and embargo, they still would not be able to have an icbm? secretary carter: they do not
have an icbm today. i wouldn't rule out that in ten years they could progress to an icbm. we've seen north korea develop n test missiles of increasing range. and they can do that on their own as the north koreans have done with not a lot of external help. it doesn't mean they would. i don't have a crystal ball of the future. a judging principally from the experience with north korea, we cannot rule that out. which is why we need to protect ourselves. protect ourselves with missile defenses, with the other statutory and other international agreements protections that we have, deterrence and everything else. senator, your time has expired. senator king. i'd ask the senators to respect
the time limit. senator: you heard the chairman. we're going to try to go through some of these questions as quickly as possible. secretary lew, what would the allies' reaction if the u.s. rejected this agreement? secretary lou: i don't want to speak for any of them. but they are already taking actions to show that they are beginning to deal with iran in a different way. the vice chancellor of germany was already over there. there is a french delegation over there. i think they are going to take a varied dim view of our rejecting this agreement. on the other hand, i do believe they respect our unilateral sanctions are and they fear them. that will put them in a vary difficult bind. but i don't think we will have as much capacity to bring the world community together in that situation as we have had up until now.
senator: i suspect the reaction would be different among china and russia? secretary lew: and if you look at the developing cannot inging countries, countries like india not in the p5+1. they are a big economy dependent on oil imports. we have had diplomatic programs to keep them in line. they will see that harder if they see the world going another way. they will ask how much capacity do we had to take enforcement actions. and they find ways around them? ultimately, they will do business more and more and other countries. senator: would it be fair to say the sanctions regime would fray if not unravel? secretary lew: i think that's fair.
senator herch: secretary carter, you just visited the middle east. is the danger proveof proliferation greater or lesser as a result of this agreement? secretary carter logic would : suggest if it's implemented, meaning ooh ran inging iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon, it's less likely other states in the region get a nuclear weapon. senator herch mr. moniz : we'll have a lot of time to talk about this. there's been this designation about the secret agreement. it's true this agreement between -- we know what the future
inspection regime will be. secretary moneys: that -- secretary moniz: that's correct. with what the jcpoa accomplished is forcingu ran to cooperate with iaea to finish the examination of past behavior. senator herch: this so-called secret agreement is for a small part of this deal ubut it's not the essence of it which is the inspection and verive -- verification. and in 28 seconds, the -- this famous 24 days, is there any way that they could clean up a facility where they had been processing fissile material sufficiently that it could not the discovered if the inspection took place after 24 days? secretary moniz: i can never say 0.00%, but with very, very high confidence, i think we would find nuclear material
utilization evidence. certainly the risk of getting caught would be extremely high. >> senator tillis? senator tillis: thank you, mr. chair. i want to get back to, and chairman dempsey, i'll start with you. i want to go back to what you said in one of your responses... to the malign activities that i believe secretary carter in response to a question says he has no reason to believe that they will change. that's the iran terror network a mother increasing threat to sire -- to cyber terror, their ballistic missile program. it's their weapons trafficking. we could get into human rights violations. we could get into an ayatollah sending a tweak out that has the image of -- some say it is the president and some say it is an american. these people are evil people and they will continue to expand in areas they think they can.
they are people who violated 27 international agreements or treaties. they have violated some of the terms of the nonproliferation treaty. some of that language is similar to the agreement we have here today. so they are dangerous. i understand why you would be concerned with the nuclear threat because it would limit other military options if they existed. so my question is, if this deal goes through what does our posture look like in the middle east and with our partners over the next two years? what looks measurably different to make us look like we are in a position to make it untenable for the iranian leadership to move forward with a new we are weapon? secretary carter: when we talk about iran, it's really the regime. it's not the iranian people. it's the irgc, qods force and their leadership. the theu iranian people, this -- the iranian people, this
would lead them to hope that there's some hope that it would place them into the international community. we are vary muscular. we have a muscular posture in the region right now. for the most part, it will stay the same, but it will shift the activities a little bit. senator tillis: secretary carter, chairman dempsey, i'm trying to get my hands around the thought process that would make the saudis less likely to acquire nuclear weapon that is capable of delivering a pakistani warhead. why would any of the leadership in saudi arabia -- you only need one to spark other nuclear proliferation -- if we are
talking about a nation that has violated a number of treaties and agreements, the possibility that that could occur and nation that -- and a nation having to prepare to have their own deterrent, where's the logic in this agreement preventing them from moving forward and having a keep ability themselves? secretary carter: the agreement doesn't limit what anybody else does. the lodge icjdge logic is if iran is effectively prevented from having a nuclear weapon which is the purpose of this then that cause at least for a saudi arabia or in egypt or turkey to get their own nuclear weapon is removed and logic would suggest that -- i cannot speak for the psychology but that is what logic would suggest. with respect to iranian behavior this comes down to a question of managing that risk.
we see exactly what -- they say at least what the leadership is thinking. the point is that it is better if they don't have a nuclear weapon than if they do. this is an effective way to make sure they don't have a nuclear weapon. it does not eliminate all risk. senator secretary carter, some : have suggested military strikes against iran could be both quick and effective without acknowledging the costs and consequences if we had to take a course of action. secretary carter: speaking now just very generally and not specifically, the two things that make it the successful
implementation and agreement preferable from that point of strike is the effects of a strike are temporary. and secondly, iran would, as i said earlier, respond to an american military strike upon iran and one needs to a through what the set when steps are including the possibility that iran, at that point, would become irreconcilably committed to getting a nuclear weapon. i say that is predicated on the effective implementation of this agreement. effectively implemented, the agreement stops iran for 15 years. way beyond that. so we are comparing that situation, which is effective implementation complete implementation of this agreement
to military options. there may not be effective upon mentation of this agreement. we have to recognize that there may not be any agreement and so forth. that is why we are under instructions from the president to preserve -- and indeed we are improving -- the military option. temporary as it is, it needs to be there because that is our fallback if that is the only path left. senator heinrich: that's predicated on the effective implementation of this
agreement. and the agreement stops iran from getting a nuclear weapon not just for ten years secretary moniz, i want to get to you. can you talk a little from the point of view of a nuclear physicist about why is -- why it is so difficult, if you have a covert facility where enrichment occurs, why it is so hard to sort of cleanup the signs of having uranium or, for that matter, plutonium at a facility like that. would an undeclared facility itself the a violation? secretary moniz on the second : part, absolutely. an undeclared facility would be a violation and, frankly, a stern response would be in order. with regard to the cover-up there is not too much we can say here in public and by just to say that dealing with
nuclear materials, whether it is enrichment or looking at the characteristics of uranium in an explosive situation, for example, it would tend to leave lots of vary small particles difficult to clean up. but beyond that, we could talk in a classified environment. senator heinrich: thank you, mr. chairman. senator: is there a term called eestnet back provision in the agreement?: senator kerry: i don't think it's specifically -- senator lee: